sense to make itself accessible even those who cannot share it in practice. (Wiredu 1996) To engage Kant with Menkiti -and Menkiti with Kant -is then to explore different possible ways of being a person. This kind of engagement need not issue in a grand consensus, let alone the truth about personhood.
Granting all this one might still ask why I have chosen to engage Kant and Menkiti in particular. In part, my reasons for this follow from the above considerations: if philosophical thinking about personhood begins from particular social contexts which such thinking seeks nonetheless in some sense to transcend, cross-contextual engagement is indispensable to it. To date, Western philosophical thinking has engaged very little with African traditions of thought. Indeed, when it comes to personhood, the Western tradition has for long periods of time barely accorded Africans the status of persons at all. Kant has been implicated in that failure. (Bernasconi, 2001; Eze 1997 ) Modern African thinking on personhood in turn developed in conscientious opposition to the perceived individualism of Western thought, often emphasizing the communal orientation of traditional African conceptions of personhood. (Appiah 2004; Gyekye 1987 Gyekye , 1992 Gbadegesin 2003; , Masolo 2006 Western philosophical traditions productively with one another. I hope to show that, despite the unavoidable compromises that need to be made, such crosscultural philosophical engagement can be productive. I shall conclude with some brief remarks on the need for greater such cross-cultural engagement in general (section VI).
II. Menkiti on Becoming a Person
In 'On the Normative Conception of a Person', Menkiti describes personhood as a temporally bounded 'ontological progression from an it to an it' (Menkiti, 2006: 324; see also Menkiti 1984) . Individual human life begins from infancy, and ends with the passage from ancestor status into the domain of the nameless dead. The 'mystery of personhood' happens in-between these two stages of nonpersonhood. Personhood is achieved through moral membership in communal life. As individuals pass from infancy to early childhood and adolescence they gradually acquire social responsibilities and corresponding entitlements. In adulthood, persons mature morally as middle age gives way to the wisdom of old age. After their biological deaths, persons (may) acquire ancestor status. 2 2 Ancestor status is not necessarily guaranteed; its achievement may depend both on a person's general conduct in life and on the community's performing the relevant burial rites. I abstract from these qualifications here. Again, it is worth noting that not all African thinkers class ancestors as persons, even Ancestors are 'the living dead': they continue to be non-physically present and continue to play an active life in the moral community. Only with the passage into 'nameless death' do ancestors cease to be persons. Menkiti's initial account thus invokes the image of personhood as an arc, marked by an ontological ascend and descend either side of a midpoint peak.
Menkiti has been much criticised for his failure to assign infants the status of persons, (Gyekye 1992; Matolino 2011 ) though I don't myself find his position on this score especially contentious. Menkiti distinguishes between being a human being and being a person. He regards them as closely related: to become a person one must be a human being. An infant is a human being with biological needs and wants which the community is called upon to satisfy for it. However, an infant does not as yet play an active moral role in the life of the community.
Perhaps more importantly, the infant as yet lacks the capacity for reflexive selfawareness, so cannot as yet say, 'I am because we are'. On Menkiti's account, a person must be conscious of herself as a participating community member. Since infants as yet lack reflexive self-awareness they are not yet persons.
It should be acknowledged that Kwame Gyekye's deeper worry concerns the power a community wields over its members when it has the authority either to assign or to withhold their status as persons. But that worry begs the question.
Why not emphasize communal responsibility instead? A community tasked with reliably making persons out of infants will fail itself where it fails to succeed in though most do not class them as deities. Similarly, in many African ontologies the class of non-physical but this-worldly beings includes more than ancestors.
All of which underlines the importance of not conflating Menkiti's position with 'the African view' in general. My thanks to Martin Odei Ajei and Uchenna Okeja for discussion. that task more than occasionally. The relevant conception of community matters here. Given the conception of personhood Menkiti describes, it is reasonable to suppose the corresponding conception of community to be one that has a moral interest in making persons out of infants. But Gyekye is anyway mistaken when he infers Menkiti's radical communitarianism from his non-essentialism about personhood. Menkiti emphasises reflexive self-awareness: 'I am because we are'. He borrows this formulation from John Mbiti, who originally affirmed it in opposition to Cartesian introspective self-knowledge (Mbiti 1969: 141) . 3 Intentionally or not, Mbiti's formula nonetheless retains Cartesian reflexivity: it is I who recognise myself as a member of my community, so I who confer socially mediated personhood status upon myself. This makes Mbiti a moderate anti-Cartesian at best, and Menkiti follows him in this regard.
Compared to infants, the case of ancestors is more interesting. An infant cannot as yet say, 'I am because we are'. However, the infant is biologically alive.
Others expect it to develop morally over the course of its increasingly active engagement in the community. Indeed, Menkiti insists that there is a 'deep connection' between biology and normativity. While biological existence is not sufficient, it appears to be necessary to attaining personhood. But in the case of ancestors, that biological connection is severed. Should this not affect ancestors' status as persons? To the extent to which he is a person, the ancestor must be able to say, 'I am because we are'. Yet in the biological sense of his being, he no longer is. 3 Mbiti's full formula is 'I am because we are, and because we are, therefore I am'.
Menkiti cites only the first half.
Other community members might say of the ancestor, 'she (still) is (morally) because we are'. The ancestor might live on metaphorically in the community's collective memory of her. But now the constraints of reflexive selfascription kick in. Of biologically live persons, Menkiti says that,
The force of the statement, 'I am because we are', is not such as to directly translate into another set of statements, for example, 'he is because we are', or 'you are because we are'. Its sense is not that of a person speaking on behalf of, or in reference to, another, but rather of an individual who recognizes the source of his or her own humanity, and so realizes, with internal assurance, that in the absence of others, no grounds exist for a claim regarding the individual's own standing as a person. (Menkiti 2006: 324) This is hardly the language of a radical communitarian: my own Although my particular choices and pursuits are contingent, the fact that I choose at all is not. Korsgaard identifies my capacity for choice in general as the unconditioned condition of my contingent choices; she further argues that I cannot but value that in virtue of which I am able to bestow subjective value, and she concludes that Groundwork's humanity formula is best read as giving philosophical expression to our intuitive self-worth as rational end-setters. Kant's discussion of the Highest Good in the second Critique takes off from the observation that a finite moral agent cannot repudiate his hope for material happiness. Indeed, such repudiation cannot be a legitimate demand of practical reason: 'happiness is also required, and indeed not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself his end but even in the judgement of an impartial reason. ' (5:110) This observation is responsive to the concern that Kant's account of everyday morality demands precisely that finite rational agents act from duty even at the cost to them of their happiness. In everyday moral experience, morality and happiness typically are at odds -the fact that they are is the most decisive indicator we have of our moral capacity for freedom. And yet happiness and morality must be reconcilable. This is the antinomy of practical reason, which the idea of the Highest God is meant to resolve.
Although the problem of happiness in proportion to virtue is a real one for Kant, his account of the Highest Good fails to offer a convincing solution to it. One difficulty lies in the fact that, tasked with reconciling 'two unequal elements', i.e., sensible happiness and non-sensible morality, the Highest Good is strictly speaking realizable neither transcendently nor immanently. From the standpoint of the finite moral agent, the reconciliation presupposes the postulate of God's existence: only the Supreme Being can effect the requisite reconciliation. But if happiness in accordance with virtue is a transcendent good attainable only in the afterlife, it is not clear how the finite being's hope for sensibly conditioned happiness can form a constituent part of it. If, on the other hand, the Highest Good is realizable immanently, it is not clear why either the idea of God or that of the immortal soul should be practically necessary presuppositions of its attainability.
The ambiguity concerning the transcendent or immanent realization of the Highest Good is forecast in Kant's uneven discussion of the relevant conception of happiness at issue. That justified hope for happiness must conform to the moral law as its supreme condition goes without saying. As noted, the finite moral agent cannot himself effect the Highest Good -for this, God's assistance is required. We are thus permitted, on practical grounds, to postulate God's existence. The finite agent can however ensure that he merits the Highest Good. The subjectively necessary condition for meriting the Highest Good is complete purity of will. Kant concedes that complete purity of will 'is a perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable'. (5:122) We are thus further permitted to postulate the immortality of our soul and to envisage the soul's 'endless progress to that perfect fitness under the presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being.' (5:122) Even my soul's endless striving necessarily remains incomplete, as even the soul remains a dependent being. Only 'the infinite Being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in this series, which is for us without end, a whole comformable to the moral law.' (5:123) God can see the completeness of my (soul's) striving, so can judge my moral merit.
The picture that emerges is of the soul as a kind of noumenal agent that strives beyond the finite agent's biological death in behalf of the Highest Good conceived in terms of happiness in proportion to virtue. This picture is unsatisfactory in numerous respects, most obviously so in respect of the soul's noted unsuitability in contributing to the finite agent's hope for sensibly conditioned happiness. But even if the requisite conception of happiness is that state analogous to bliss, there is an odd shift of attention from the finite agent's moral focus on her duties towards others to the soul's concern to being deemed morally meritorious in the eyes of God. There is something unattractively self-regarding about this latter concern. Granted, the idea of the Highest Good cannot motivate this-worldly moral agency but must rather arise from moral agency itself; granted further that moral merit in the eyes of God depends on conscientious discharge of worldly duties towards others.
Even so, it is God's judgement of moral merit that secures the soul's (not the finite agent's!) happiness (as bliss). It is difficult to avoid the impression of a fairly decisive shift from an earthly moral life shared with finite others to a morally primary relationship with God. Given these worries, one may be tempted by Korsgaard's immanent reconciliation of happiness and morality.
And yet, for Kant, the idea of the Highest Good arises out of an acknowledgement of the stringently non-self-regarding demands of thisworldly morality. It is the very focus on our duties towards others that gives rise to the hope for happiness in the afterlife. So although they are in tension, there is also a deep connection between the other-personal orientation of this-worldly morality and the soul's focus on moral merit in the afterlife. 
IV. Practical Belief in Ancestral Existence
In returning to ancestors' non-physical status it is important not to confuse them with other-worldly souls or deities: ancestors are non-physical persons who continue to exist in the world of the living -the only world there is, to 'nothingness'? 7
The ontologically uncertain status of the nameless dead redounds on that of the ancestors who, though biologically dead, continue to live morally.
Indeed, according to the maximal conception, ancestors are at the peak of moral personhood; they are both least physical and most moral. One might account for this asymmetry in terms of ancestors' transcendence of the initially necessary biological basis of personhood. However, given their mindindependent existence, the case for ancestors' world-internal transcendence of their physical being cannot be made with reference to either communal memory or a person's projected future existence as an ancestor. We are owed some account of how ancestors' this-worldly non-physical existence is possible.
In 'Physical and Metaphysical Understanding' (Menkiti 2004 ), Menkiti contrasts the 'African metaphysical temperament' with Western metaphysical thinking. The latter is said to feel a strong pull towards (world-external) dualism. This yields the problem of interactionism, which recent Western 6 I here follow Menkiti in using the two terms interchangeably. non-material agency', Menkiti attributes to traditional African society 'a belief system that is fully committed to material agency but that trades on an extended notion of what is embraced by the material universe'. (Menkiti 2004: 121) I find this unhelpful; it is not clear to me how one can be both 'fully committed to a material universe' and embrace an 'extended notion' of the same? However one specifies materiality, it cannot contain its negation. If ancestral existence is non-material, it will remain so on an extended notion of materiality. Perhaps for this reason Menkiti goes on to say that members of traditional African societies would give a 'material or quasi-material account of non-material agency'. Unlike 'non-materiality', the idea of 'quasi-material' entities suggests that ancestors are like material entities in some respects. We are then owed a specification of the extent of that likeness. More to the point, while giving a material explanation of non-material agency looks like a contradiction in terms, a quasi-material explanation of non-material agency resembles a reductivist move -precisely what Menkiti rejects in Western metaphysics.
A little later Menkiti says that while there are facts about the material universe that we do understand, there are also facts about it that we do not yet understand. (Menkiti 2004 : 123/4) Here he may be pushing against reductivism: that we cannot explain non-material agency in material terms does not entitle us to discount the possibility of its existence. Alternatively, he may be moving towards reductivism: eventually, what we currently take to be non-material agency will be explicable in material terms. Either way, Menkiti fails to shed light on the matter.
Menkiti may have dug himself in. He borrows the notion of 'quasimateriality' from Kwasi Wiredu. However, Wiredu employs it in the service of a conclusion that runs counter to Menkiti's intentions. Like Menkiti, Wiredu rejects so-called Western dualism; he takes members of his own cultural group, the Akan of modern Ghana, to be disposed towards what he calls 'a level-headed empiricism' according to which 'the universe is ontologically homogeneous'. In this universe, 'everything that exists exists in exactly the same sense as everything else. And this sense is empirical, broadly speaking'. (Wiredu 1996: 49) Wiredu concedes that the Akan do believe in ancestral existence; he coins the term "quasi-material" to refer to 'any being or entity conceived as spatial but lacking some of the properties of material objects.' (Wiredu 1996: 53 While knowledge is a holding to be true based on non-voluntary epistemic assent, belief (Glaube) is based on voluntary non-epistemic assent. (Chignell 2007a; 2007 b) Ordinarily, we do not decide to believe; relevant available evidence usually determines our judgement as to whether or not X is the case.
In the case of practical belief, by contrast, we do in a sense 'decide to believe'.
We do so non-arbitrarily, i.e. on the basis of non-evidentiary practical considerations. For the same reason, the critical demands of practical belief are especially stringent: while assent on practical grounds can be rational, and while '"commonsense" people will have a lot of [practical beliefs]', critical such assent should include reflective acknowledgement of its epistemic insufficiency. (Chignell 2007a: 56 ). Chignell's contrast between non-voluntary epistemic assent and voluntary non-epistemic assent echoes Kant's own qualification in the second Critique that 'the righteous man may say: 'I will there to be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the understanding, and finally that my duration be endless'.
(5:143, emphasis added) At the same time one may remain unconvinced that to will oneself to believe really is to believe, not least if its critical component lies in withholding judgement as to the truth -or falsity -of that belief.
(Gardner 2006)
In one sense, this last consideration may pose a greater challenge in relation to practical belief in this-worldly ancestral existence than in relation to practical belief in other-worldly souls. Kant says that it is a necessary condition of our warrant for the postulates that affirmation of their propositional content be practically necessary. Arguably, affirmation of ancestral existence is practically necessary (I say more on this in the next section). However, it is a further condition of the postulates' practically warranted affirmability that their propositional content not conflict with the conditions of sensible knowledge. Postulating the existence of God, the soul, freedom, meets that condition on the assumption that their non-sensible existence or non-existence is theoretically undecidable. By contrast, ancestral existence is this-worldly, so must by Kant's lights be susceptible to our possible sensible experience. This may seem to take us back to Wiredu's conclusions about the inadmissibility of belief in this-worldly ancestral existence. And yet that conclusion fails to acknowledge the legitimate interests of morality. Recall: ancestors are biologically dead but morally alive. They exist non-physically in the same world as biologically live persons; they are persons, not deities, i.e., revered for their wisdom but not worshipped as omniscient or omnipotent. How might belief in ancestral existence impact a person's moral self-conception? One who believes in ancestral existence will hope one day to become an ancestor herself. This hope will guide her throughout her biological life: I call this 'living towards ancestral status'. One who believes in ancestral existence will also believe herself to be surrounded by ancestors whose moral claims upon her she must give due consideration: I call this 'living with ancestors '. 9 One can think of living towards ancestral status as constituting the overall criterion for a morally successful life. Someone who looks forward to becoming an ancestor will regard attainment of that status as the successful completion of her personhood. Given ancestors' general function of moral support for the community, living by the ancestral criterion means that a person's goals for herself and her interest in the good for her community will be consonant with one another; it will be impossible successfully to complete the journey of personhood in essential conflict with one's community. This does not mean that there cannot be friction. A person is reflexively aware of herself as a community member, so her sense of self is distinct from albeit bound up with that of her community. She will have a mind of her own, will exercises her own judgement in relation to matters concerning community and self. Nonetheless, such a person's overall moral orientation will lie towards achieving a harmonious relation between the interests of self and 9 The following draws on my more extended discussion in chapter 6 of Flikschuh, forthcoming. those of community: discord between self and community will simultaneously constitute discord within the self.
In Western contexts, we are apt to see such a communal orientation as indicative of a failure of moral autonomy. This is largely prejudicial: a person's concern to integrate personal and communal good need be no more indicative of a lack of moral autonomy than a person's readiness to discard communal constraints need be a sign of moral maturity. The principal point here is that one for whom moral completion takes the form of post-mortem moral existence as a revered member of the community will work hard to achieve a sense of self through engagement with community, not apart from it.
More is at stake here than pious afterthoughts about the virtues of a less than wholly self-regarding life -of the virtue of also considering the Again, we may be inclined to interpret the inclusion of ancestral moral claims as indicative of social backwardness -of attachment to superstitious belief and as a bar to social development. Again, however, this is largely prejudicial. What is philosophically interesting about the added ancestral dimension is its impact on the moral self-understanding of the living. To put the point somewhat aphoristically, the ancestral dimension within everyday moral deliberation makes death integral to moral life: if the dead remain persons, our acknowledgement and treatment of them as such establishes an on-going moral connection between the living and the dead that deepens our sense of our moral interdependence in general. That dependence is seen as 10 Though traditionally, food is often left out for the ancestors; at burial the dead are also given many utensils of which it is believed they may need them. essentially positive; it is not conceived as a lack or a limitation: the dead look after the living and the living look after the dead -together, they secure communal continuity across time.
Turning from these unavoidably incomplete reflections on ancestral existence to Kant's immortality of the soul, one striking contrast is that between a sense of moral completion within community and of an infinite horizon beyond it. At the point of a person's physical death the soul parts company with the living and embarks on a timeless path towards God. The telos becomes moral communion with God. This is evidently Christian eschatology; Kant's aim in the second Critique is to give that eschatology a moral orientation. One can hardly fault Kant for his moral engagement with Christian eschatology -to the contrary, it reflects a practical concern which, like that of Menkiti, is guided by ordinary moral and religious experience. Still, the final orientation towards the divine must impact on a person's moral selfunderstanding overall.
I noted the ambivalence in Kant's conception of happiness in relation to the Highest Good, and the more general problem of bridging the gulf between freedom and nature -I set these issues aside here. What interests me here is the implied relation within a person's moral self-understanding between living others, the soul, and God. It strikes me that Kant resolves the issue of human finitude in a significantly different way from Menkiti.
Ultimately, it is God, not others, who sustains the dependent soul. How, then, does the soul's sensibly embodied bearer relate to others through its dependence on God? Put differently, which relation has moral primacy: that between embodied temporal moral agents, or that between soul and God?
The idea of some sort of Cartesian remainder, mooted earlier, is relevant here: I suggested that while Kant's insistence on the moral agent's opacity to itself is continuous with the first Critique rejection of introspective self-knowledge, the postulate of the soul re-invokes the idea of the self as a kind of noumenal agent that can pursue and even partake of a kind of happiness. We commit to this idea as no more than a practical belief. Nonetheless, even if in merely willing our souls to be immortal we will no more than the possibility of our sustained moral agency in the face of earthly adversity, the idea of the soul is the idea of a something or a someone that abides -ultimately, in God. If the real moral self -or even only the thought of such -ultimately seeks or abides
in God, what is the moral significance of others, co-humans, to the thisworldly, self-effacing moral agent? Does the presence of God as ultimate sustainer of the moral self not threaten to render this-worldly inter-human moral relations insufficient onto themselves?
That, at any rate, is the worry that emerges in the light of Menkiti's conception of a this-worldly, altogether human moral afterlife. In reflecting on this worry one should remember the deep connection I noted between what Kant diagnoses as our sense of the world's moral recalcitrance and practical faith in the Highest Good: the idea of the Highest Good is a response to that recalcitrance, not an alternative to it. Thus, in turning to the Highest Good and with it to soul and God we do not turn away from the world and others. We rather sustain our moral faith in them even despite plenty of empirical evidence to the contrary. And yet, we need God to be able to do so. While it would be mistaken to read Kant's doctrine of the postulate as indicative of a moral turn away from others and towards God, it also appears that the soul's turn to God is needed to prevent a collapse of moral faith in oneself and others. In contrast to Menkiti's account, there is an extra-human dimension within human moral affairs the absence of which would undermine human moral relations. I find that thought morally unsettling in a way in which I do not find Menkiti's contrasting account unsettling, and I wonder whether belief in non-physical, this-worldly ancestral existence is not a price worth paying.
VI. Thinking Cross-Culturally
Let me summarise the principal results of the above discussion before concluding with some brief remarks on the general need for greater cross- One may wonder whether affirmation of the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical engagement and simultaneous denial of the ready translatability of one set of beliefs into another is not to commit the incoherence of philosophical relativism. I do not think so: others' often quite markedly different beliefs need not be unintelligible to us just because we happen not to share them. Nor need we array them along some axis of historical development in order to render them intelligible to ourselves as the sort of superstitious beliefs we ourselves once held: these are outmoded responses to the fact that not everyone thinks alike. We are meant to live, today, in a world of different cultures' moral and political equality -we regard our own political principles as chief purveyors of that commitment. If so, our philosophical thinking will have to accommodate itself to that commitment. (Flikschuh 2014 ) Is this merely a plea for political correctness, as some have suggested to me in responses to earlier presentations of this paper? I prefer to think of it as a plea for greater intellectual curiosity. Will serious intellectual engagement with the thoughts of others spell the end of the Western philosophical tradition, even of Western civilization? Of course not -persistent failure so to engage with the thoughts of others in a rapidly changing moral and political world is much more likely to achieve that particular result. What will we gain?
Exposure to interesting ideas unfamiliar to us, such as the idea of ancestral existence, and the philosophical fascination they are able to exert on us even if we cannot share them in practice.
